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Abstract
This note shows that the work by Simon and Tomkowicz (Israel J Math 227(1):215–
231, 2018) answers another outstanding open question in game theory in addition to
the non-existence of approximate Harsányi equilibrium in Bayesian games: it shows
that strategic form games with bounded and separately continuous payoffs need not
possess approximate equilibria.
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A strategic form game, with bounded and separately continuous payoffs, is a triple
〈N , (Xi )i∈N , (ui )i∈N 〉, where N a finite collection of players, and for each i ∈ N ,
Xi is a compact convex set in some locally convex topological vector space, and
ui : ∏i∈N Xi → R is a bounded function which is affine in Xi and which is, for each
j ∈ N , continuous in X j when other components are held constant. A particular case
of such games is when Xi is the set of probability measures Δ(Ai ) over a compact
set Ai in some metric space endowed with the topology of weak convergence, and ui
is the multi-linear extension of some bounded separately continuous payoff function
on
∏
i Ai , known as the mixed extension (to this extent,
∏




In the two-player zero-sum case, Sion’s minmax theorem, Sion (1958), shows that
the separate continuity is sufficient to guarantee existence of the value; the existence
of optimal strategies follows. (Indeed, if u : X1 × X2 → R is separately continuous,
x → miny∈Y u(x, y) is upper-semicontinuous and hence obtains a maximum at an
optimal strategy of the maximizer, i.e. of Player 1; and similarly for Player 2.) In the
non-zero-sum case, however, an equilibrium need not exist; Vieille (1996) presents an
example of a two-player non-zero-sum game ‘on the square’, i.e. in which each agent
has action space [0, 1], the mixed extension of which possesses no equilibrium.
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It has remained open until now, however, the question of whether such games must
possess ε-equilibria for each ε > 0; a profile x = (xi )i∈N is a ε-equilibrium iff
sup
yi∈Xi
ui (yi , x−i ) ≤ ui (x) + ε, ∀i ∈ N (1)
(The case ε = 0 is simply an equilibrium.) This note shows that the example Simon
and Tomkowicz (2018) gives a negative answer to this question.
The Bayesian game model of Simon and Tomkowicz (2018) fits into the following
general model of Bayesian games: An underlying state spaceΩ with σ -algebraF and
probability measure μ is given onF . There are N players, each (for simplicity) with a
finite action set Ai , a boundedmeasurable payoff function ri : Ω×∏i∈N Ai → R, and
a knowledge σ -algebra Fi ⊆ F . (This model is similar to the model in Stinchcombe
(2011), except there the state space is a product of types spaces for each player,
endowedwith product σ -algebra; the general framework recalled here translates easily
to this one.) A pure (resp. mixed) strategy σi of Player i is a mapping Ω → Ai (resp.
→ Δ(Ai )) which is Fi -measurable. (A pure strategy can be viewed a mixed strategy
which assigns onlyDiracmeasures.) For a profile σ = (σi )i∈N of strategies, the payoff
to Player i is given by













Clearly, two strategy profiles σ = (σi )i∈N and τ = (τi )i∈N which agree μ-a.e.
yield the same payoffs, and hence one may treat the strategy space of Player i to be
Xi = L∞((Ω,μ),Δ(Ai )), the space of μ-measurable functions from Ω to Δ(Ai )
modulo μ-a.e. equality, endowed with the weak-∗ topology which makes it a compact
metrizable space. (See, e.g., Rudin (2006) for the relevant background.) Furthermore,
taking this collection of (Xi )i∈N of action spaces makes the payoff functons (ui )
defined in (2) clearly bounded but also separately continuous; indeed,










a−i∈∏ j =i A j
ri (ω, ai , a−i )
∏
j =i










a−i∈∏ j =i A j
ri (ω, ai , a−i )
∏
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=i




is in L1((Ω,μ),R). Stinchcombe (2011) discusses, at length, how these functions in
general are not jointly continuous in all strategies, and characterizes precisely when
discontinuities arise.
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The notions discussed in Simon and Tomkowicz (2018) of Harsányi equilibrium
and ε-Harsányi equilibrium are precisely the usual notions of equilibrium and ε-
equilibrium in the auxilliary strategic form game described above with actions spaces
(L∞((Ω,μ),Δ(Ai )))i∈N and payoffs defined by (2). Using standard measurable
selection theorems, the definition given using (1) is equivalent to the following defi-
nition:
Definition 1 Fix a Bayesian game as above, and let ε > 0. A strategy profile σ =
(σ i )i∈I , with σi ∈ Xi := L∞((Ω,μ),Δ(Ai )), is an Harsányi ε-equilibrium, if for






r i (ω, bi , σ−i (ω)) − r i (ω, σ (ω))
]
dμ(ω) ≤ ε. (3)
where r i has been extended multi-linearly to
∏N
i=1 Δ(Ai ).
In particular, the example in Simon (2003) of aBayesian game inwhich noHarsányi
equilibrium exists, as well as the somewhat stronger example in Hellman (2014), gave
yet more examples of a strategic form game with bounded separately continuous pay-
off not posessing equilibrium. However, both these examples can be shown to possess
ε-Harsányi equilibria for each ε > 0; see Hellman and Levy (2020). The example in
Simon and Tomkowicz (2018) of a Bayesian game possessing no ε-Harsányi equilib-
rium hence gives an example of a strategic form game possessing no ε-equilibrium
for ε > 0 small enough.
It is to be noted that the example in Simon and Tomkowicz (2018) uses three players
(see the discussion on Simon and Tomkowicz 2018, p. 230). It is still an open question
as to whether two-player bounded separately continuous strategic form games must
possess ε-equilibria.
Finally, it is noted:
Proposition 1 The mixed extension of an N-player bounded separately continuous
strategic form game, with compact metric action spaces, in which all but at most one
player have jointly continuous payoff functions, possesses an ε-equilibrium for each
ε > 0.
Indeed, in the 2-player game presented in Vieille (1996), the payoff of Player 1 is
a quadratic form in two variables, and hence ε-equilibria exist.
Proof Let ε > 0. W.l.o.g, u j (·) is jointly continuous in all actions, i.e. continuous
on
∏N
i=1 Xi , for each j = 1, . . . , N − 1. For each j = 1, . . . , N − 1, let X ′j ⊆ X j
be finite, such that for each x j ∈ X j there is x ′j ∈ X ′j s.t. for all x− j ∈
∏
i = j Xi ,
|u j (x j , x− j )−u j (x ′j , x− j )| < ε, i.e., so that the functions (u j (x ′j , ·))x ′j∈X ′j are ε-dense
w.r.t. to supremum-norm in the set of functions (u j (x j , ·))x j∈X j . Such X ′1, . . . , X ′N−1
exist by the assumed joint continuity of u1, . . . , uN−1 and the compactness of the
action spaces.
For j = 1, . . . , N , let v j denote the restriction of u j to (∏N−1i=1 X ′i ) × XN . The
(vi )
N
i=1 are continuous. Let x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗N ) be an equilibrium of the mixed exten-
sion of (vi )Ni=1 . Clearly, in the original game (u j )
N
j=1, Player N has no profitable
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deviation against (x∗1 , . . . , x∗N−1) in XN , as uN (x∗−N , ·) = vN (x∗−N , ·). Furtheremore,
since x∗ is an equilibrium under (v j )Nj=1, it holds for each j = 1, . . . , N − 1,
u j (x
∗) = v j (x∗) = max
x∈X ′j
v j (x, x
∗− j ) = max
x∈X ′j
u j (x, x
∗− j ) ≥ maxx∈X j u j (x, x
∗− j ) − ε
where the last inequality uses the approximation properties of X ′j . 
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